以下内容需要花费现金10才可以浏览，您只有现金0，无法购买。Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006
Games and Information continues to do well despite the continued flow of books on
game theory and industrial organization, and the arrival of a number of specialized books
on topics such as contracting and auctions. I’ve had emails from readers in Canada, Chile,
China, Dubai, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Korea, Malaysia, Man,
Mexico, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, and the United States. This encourages
me to think a new edition would be worthwhile, incorporating, especially, new models
and ways to organize thoughts for the the material on asymmetric information in the second
half of the book. I have also added more homework problems, and fourteen classroom
games, one at the end of each chapter.
Besides the specific changes mentioned below, I have made minor changes throughout
the book. I have, for example, renamed the strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma from
Deny and Confess to Silence and Blame. The new terms are less conventional, but they
do avoid avoid the confusion in the abbreviations C and D with Cooperate and Defect,
two other commonly used terms I dislike because they invite confusion with cooperative
games and deviations in strategies. This is an illustration of how I have tried to think of
writing up the material in this book.
The chapters that have been most changed are Chapters 10 (Mechanisms), 13 (Auctions),
and 14 (Pricing), but there is also new material in other chapters.
Chapter 3 (Mixed Strategies) now has material on Bertrand equilibrium and strategic
substitutes and complements formerly in Chapter 14 and material on patent races formerly
in Chapter 15. It has a new section on existence of equilibrium, and an example of how a
pure strategy can be strictly dominated by a mixed strategy.
Chapter 7 (Moral Hazard I) has a discussion of quasilinear utility functions and the
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effect of changes in bargaining power.
Chapter 8 (Moral Hazard II) has a new section on Holmstrom & Milgrom’s 1991 idea
of multitask agency, in which the agent uses more than one kind of effort and generates
multiple outputs, only one of which can be well measured.
Chapter 9 (Adverse Selection) has a new version of the Production Game to illustrate
the combination of moral hazard with adverse selection.
Chapter 10 (Mechanisms) also has a new version of the Production Game, used to
illustrate mechanism design and the new topic of the Maskin matching scheme. I have
added a section on the Sender-Receiver game of Crawford and Sobel. I’ve cut back on the
treatment of Myerson’s Trading Game, giving just one version instead of three. In general, I
have tried to make the notation and analysis of this chapter more uniform, putting special
emphasis on the standard outcome that the bad type’s participation constraint and the
good type’s incentive compatibility constraints are binding. I have moved away from the
term “moral hazard with hidden knowledge” in favor of the more direct “post- contractual
hidden knowledge”.
Chapter 11 (Signalling) contains the new topic of countersignalling (introduced in
Feltovich, Harbaugh & To [2002]), under which middle-quality types signal, but the best
types deliberately do not, instead relying on other means of conveying their type. I have
also replaced the 3rd editions’s model of limit pricing as signal jamming with a new, simpler
model.
Chapter 13 (Auctions) is the most drastically changed, by far. In earlier editions the
treatment of auctions was relatively nontechnical because I wished to avoid the difficult
task of trying to convey that intricate but unified literature in the simplified but formal
style of the rest of the book. By now, however, enough new treatments of the old material
has appeared for the unities in auction theory to be presented more simply, and so I’ve
made the chapter much longer, and technical. This allows me to add topics such as all- pay
auctions, proof of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, the marginal-revenue interpetation of
reserve prices, a formal model comparing different auction rules in a common-value auction,
Klemperer’s Wallet Game, affiliation, and linkage.
Chapter 14 (Pricing) has a section on vertical quality differentiation, by a monopolist
and by a duopoly, which also allows discussion of “crimping the product”.
I have dropped Chapter 15 (Entry), though it remains available at the website. Its
topics had no technical unity, and while they served well as examples of techniques from
earlier chapters, I decided that they contained enough examples, especially as new editions
have been increasing the number of models in those earlier chapters.
