小额信贷偿还机制的理论研究动态

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采用与传统银行业不同的贷款技术，小额信贷取得了极高的偿还率，为贫困人口提供了贷款渠道。理论文献通过抽象小额信贷运行的社会经济环境，分析了连带责任、次序融资、定期还款、小组基金等技术安排，利用横向选择、横向监督、动态激励、定期还款与担保替代等机制，解决了金融中介机构常见的信贷风险问题——逆向选择、项目选择、努力程度选择、审计成本、策略性违约。近20年来对于小额信贷机制的理论研究，建立了小额信贷横向选择（Ghatak，1999；2000）、横向监督（Stiglitz，1990；Besley and Coate，1995)、动态激励机制（Chowdhury，2005；2007）的基本研究框架，为小额贷款在农村金融环境下成功破解信贷风险难题提供了比较经典的理论解释。
分析近20年来对于小额信贷机制的理论研究，可以发现如下研究趋势：
第一，在基本研究框架下，不断放宽模型的假设，逐渐与现实逼近，得出各种真实金融环境下更加富有解释力的命题。例如，Guttman（2008）在多期博弈模型下对于横向选择机制的分析，证明了正向的选择配对效应可行性空间的减小；Laffont and N’Guessan（2000）、Laffont（2003）、Laffont and Rey（2003）在最优化框架中对于合谋问题的分析，证明了连带责任贷款技术的绩效会降低。伴随小额信贷实践的发展，其使命以及特征发生了重要变化（Copestake，2007）。对于小额信贷机制的分析，也逐渐在新的框架下展开。例如，Conning（1999；2005）关注了小额信贷的可持续性发展要求，在多个代理人多任务框架下分析了小额信贷机制的效率；Emran et al.（2006）关注到第二代小额信贷的特征，分析了就业市场的特征对小额信贷机制的影响。

第二，逐渐超越连带责任贷款技术，关注其他贷款技术引发的小额信贷机制。对混合机制的模型研究不断出现，为了解不同机制的优劣、混合机制的选择安排以及综合效果等问题提供了重要洞见。例如，Roy Chowdhury（2005；2007）、Tedeschi（2006）、Aniket（2007）对包含次序融资、有条件再次贷款的连带责任贷款合同进行了分析，比较了横向监督与动态激励的分离或混合机制的绩效；Jain and Mansuri（2003）对于定期还款计划的研究，分析了小额信贷项目对非正规贷款人的“挤入”效应。此外，新的小额贷款技术也得到了关注。例如，Fedele and Lundberg（2006）分析了环形贷款技术（The O-Ring Technology）的机制[1]；Aniket（2005）分析了对轮转基金（Rotating Saving and Credit Association，ROSCA）计划加以改进的小额信贷项目的机制[2]。这种研究趋势表明，对于小额信贷偿还机制的研究出现了更加深入的倾向。
第三，部分研究开始采用实验经济学方法，来测验不同机制下借、贷双方的行为选择以及最终均衡。例如，Giné et al.（2006）、Bauer et al.（2008）利用实验博弈方法，对小额信贷博弈中的借、贷双方的行为基础进行了分析。这类研究，对小额信贷偿还机制的理论研究提供了重要的补充，对于小额信贷机制的效应分析提供了行为经济学的检验。

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关键词：理论研究 小额信贷 Association Technology Technolog 研究 理论 动态 机制 信贷

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不知所云啊

就是我想要的，感谢lz

麽东西可以下载？

可是论文不在其中啊，要是还有下载就好了~~~~

有点复杂。。看不太懂

没有结合实际，建议看看宁夏的“掌政模式”和“惠民模式”

听起来很不错的论文啊···可惜不能下载

鼓励发帖。