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作者：英国《金融时报》克莱夫•克鲁克(Clive Crook) 2008-10-20

目前，对金融市场的干预规模大得令人吃惊，在数个星期前，这还是不可想象的事。看起来，这会是独一无二的。一场如此严重、包含如此多意识形态意味在内的危机，必然意味着一场政治力量重组，许多我们自认为了解的政府和市场角色都将发生转变。各方面都在进行这样的争论，许多人也希望如此。
这是可能的，大萧条(Great Depression)过后出现过这种情况。但这场危机会像那次一样深远地改变世界，我表示怀疑。我甚至怀疑，它最终不会改变多少关于国家和市场的传统看法。
在思考上世纪30年代的类似事件时，一个重要问题是：突发的金融危机会在多大程度上影响经济的其它方面。大萧条改变了美国和世界，是因为它毁掉了无数人的生活。
美国和其它许多国家面临着一场严重的衰退——不过，当然不能与那场持续的灾难相比。虽然在应对此次危机上有一些问题，但与此前的数次危机相比，这次的补救措施既迅速又有力。尽管在过去数周，各方面就如何稳定形势发生争论，但我们要承认，达成共识的速度令人吃惊——以充分的资源（就是说无限制的）救市的意愿，一直就不是一个问题。简而言之，政府没有重蹈上世纪30年代的覆辙。
梳理救市措施的细节会很棘手，但现在原则已经明确，政府正围绕这些原则制定政策。首先，解决抵押担保证券市场中的流动性问题。其次，大规模注入公共资本，同时引入新的私人资本。第三，通过提供暂时担保，激活银行间同业拆借市场。第四，(尤其在美国)加大努力减缓抵押赎回权丧失(mortgage foreclosures)，以缓解市场担忧，防止房价超调。
英国最先采取了其中大多数措施，在这个问题上，立法机构权力不大，对政府倒是有利的。美国政府不得不先经过国会，因而耗时要久一些。纾困计划及美联储(Fed)现有权力是否为以上所有措施留有充足的余地，美国政府将就此辩论。但是，被华尔街动荡搞得晕头转向的汉克•保尔森(Hank Paulson)，已经在行动了。这四项补充措施——危机结束前，仅在美国就将投入1或2万亿纳税人的钱——完全有希望控制对实体经济的损害，以防陷入一场严重的衰退，引起新一轮大萧条。
人们还可以预知危机后监管体系的主要特点。查尔斯•古德哈特(Charles Goodhart)和阿维纳什•佩尔绍德(Avinash Persaud)今年1月31日为本专栏撰稿时指出了这一特点：逆经济周期的资本需求。基本观点很简单：当银行贷款以极快的速度扩张时，强迫它们更快地增加资本。金融崩溃几乎总是发生在信贷繁荣之后。逆周期资本需求向信贷扩张施加了压力，为破产提供更大的缓冲。
当然，还需要解决相当多的其它问题，包括“银行”这个词对这些目的的意义（其意义需要拓展）；对衍生品的监管；对抵押贷款的监管；国际监管套利的机会(至少，会促进国家监管机构间更紧密的合作)。当然，所有这些措施都出台并付诸实施后，逆周期资本将是重点。
假如美国和世界侥幸，只是陷入一场严重的衰退，而非陷入一场大萧条，并建立了一套新的监管体系——这套体系在景气时期对放贷机构施以更为严格的约束。这将给有关国家和市场的基本争论，以及政府干预经济其它领域的前景带来什么影响？
我的猜测是：仅会在言辞上对上述基本争论加以调整，与危机前相比，不会有什么改变。这是因为对抗性力量在起作用，限制了任何实质改变。
就思想界而言，市场怀疑论者开始明确占上风。除非另有变化，亲市场派的必胜信念已经终结。在美国，很有可能是巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)当选美国总统——不仅仅因为危机，尽管这起到推动作用——他将拥有民主党人占多数的国会，这将有助于施政。奥巴马在政治演说中，将金融突发危机归咎于放松管制和被奉为开支教条的“涓滴经济学”(trickle-down economics)。奥巴马表示，这一切已成定论。
我们走着瞧吧。奥巴马的雄心，如让所有美国人享受医疗保险，整修美国破败的基础设施，让家庭负担得起大学教育，为几乎所有人减税——这一切值得赞美，但将与救援计划加在当前和未来纳税人身上的巨额负担产生冲突。布什政府留下的财政混乱，会令问题变得更糟。假如奥巴马胜出，就思想界而言，大气候对他是有力的；但就财政问题及眼看这些账单到期的纳税人而言，大气候对他是不力的。除了暂时性刺激措施和金融稳定，面对其它问题时，大环境将迫使下一任总统在财政方面相对保守。
此外，还有一个更广泛的问题。金融危机事实上就是监管失灵，监管体系遭到了创新的冲击。监管部门需要迎头赶上，并且你可以这样讲，努力抑制创新。但是，金融不是普通行业。我们需要思索的问题是：无论是在美国还是其它国家的哪个非金融行业，政府或选民会认为抑制创新(创新同样被视为市场力量)是个好主意？

英文原文
A system overwhelmed by innovation
By Clive Crook 2008-10-20

The stunning scale of the interventions under way in financial markets - barely imaginable just weeks ago - make it seem that nothing will ever be the same. A crisis so grave, so weighted with ideological implications, must point to a grand political realignment, with much of what we thought we knew about the role of governments and markets overthrown. So it is argued, and so many people hope.
It is possible. It happened after the Great Depression. But I doubt that this crisis will change the world anything like as profoundly. In the end, I doubt it will even overthrow much of the conventional wisdom about states and markets.
In thinking through the parallel with the 1930s, the important question is how far the financial emergency will infect the rest of the economy. The Depression changed the US and the world because it wrecked the lives of countless millions of people.
The US and many other countries face a bad recession - but surely nothing to compare with that sustained catastrophe. Ragged as the response to this emergency seems, we will look back and say that, compared with previous crises, the remedies were both prompt and massive. Notwithstanding the past few weeks' arguments about how to stabilise the situation, we will also say that consensus was achieved with surprising speed - and that the willingness to support it with sufficient resources (meaning without limit) was never really in question. In short, the mistakes of the 1930s are not being repeated.
Sorting out the details of the response will be messy but the principles are now clear and policy is forming around them. First, address illiquidity in the market for mortgage-backed securities. Second, inject public capital on a huge scale, drawing in new private capital at the same time. Third, revive the inter-bank market with temporary guarantees. Fourth, especially in the US, step up efforts to slow mortgage foreclosures, to relieve the distress and stop house prices undershooting.
Britain was first to put most of these elements in place. It helps to have an impotent legislature. The US administration has to ask Congress first, so these things take a little longer. Washington will argue about whether the rescue package, together with the Federal Reserve's existing powers, leave enough wiggle room for all of the above. But Hank Paulson, reeling from this week's turmoil on Wall Street, is on board. Those four complementary parts, backed before this is over with a trillion or two of taxpayers' money in the US alone, have every chance of limiting the damage to the real economy to a bad recession, as opposed to a new Depression.
One can also predict the central feature of the post-crisis regulatory regime. It was suggested on this page on January 31 by Charles Goodhart and Avinash Persaud: contra-cyclical capital requirements. The basic idea is simple: force banks to build up capital faster when their lending is expanding most rapidly. Financial busts almost always follow credit booms. Contra-cyclical capital requirements tax the expansion of credit and build a bigger cushion for any bust.
Very many other issues will need to be addressed, of course, including the meaning of the term "bank" for these purposes (it will have to be widened); regulation of derivatives; regulation of mortgages; and opportunities for international regulatory arbitrage (which put a premium on, at a minimum, closer co-operation among national regulators). Still, when all is said and done, contra-cyclical capital will be the central idea.
Suppose that the US and the world escape with a bad recession but no worse, and that a new regulatory system - one that shackles lenders more tightly in good times - is put in place. Where would this leave the underlying argument about state and market, and the prospects for government intervention in other parts of the economy?
My guess is: rhetorically adjusted, about where it was before the crisis. This is because countervailing forces are in play, limiting any net effect.
The intellectual climate has already moved decisively in favour of market-sceptics. Until further notice, pro-market triumphalism is over. In the US, most likely, Barack Obama will be elected - not just because of the crisis, though it helps - and he will have big Democratic majorities in Congress to help him govern. His stump speech ties the emergency to deregulation and "trickle-down economics", the outgoing doctrines. All that is history, he says.
We shall see. Mr Obama's laudable ambitions to extend health insurance to all Americans, to refurbish the country's failing infrastructure, to make a college education affordable and to cut nearly everybody's taxes will run up against the amazing demands that the rescue will place on present and future taxpayers. The fiscal mess left behind by the Bush administration makes the problem much worse. Supposing he wins, the intellectual climate will be strongly on Mr Obama's side; the fiscal climate, and taxpayers watching these bills fall due, will not. Circumstances will force the next president to be a fiscal conservative on matters other than temporary stimulus and financial stability
There is a broader point. The financial crisis was indeed a failure of regulation. The system was overwhelmed by innovation. Regulators are going to have to catch up and, you could say, try to hold innovation back. But finance is not a normal industry. The question to ponder is this: in which other industries will curbing innovation - also known as market forces - strike governments or voters, in the US or anywhere else, as a good idea?

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