China's Economy: 60 Years of Progress (Part 4)

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Chen's group formally submitted these directives to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The regulations were designed to give more power to local governments and delegate power to local administrative organs, generating motivational enthusiasm and giving free rein to local enterprise initiatives. On November 14, the standing committee ratified the regulations. They were to take effect in 1958. So the transfer of administrative power in 1958 primarily consisted of the following:
　
-- Transferring enterprise jurisdiction. The CPC Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued directives April 11 under a Regulation of the Transfer of Authority for Industrial Enterprises. The directives said that, aside from a small number of special and experimental enterprises that the State Council deemed important, management authority for all enterprises would be held by individual local governments. As a result, 88 percent of enterprises and state-owned institutions that were once subordinate to the central government were transferred to local governments. Some were transferred to neighborhoods and communes. To put the matter in perspective, industrial enterprises subordinate to the central government accounted for 39.7 percent of China's total industrial output in 1957. But in 1958 that number decreased dramatically to 13.8 percent.
-- Transferring resource allocation authority. This step included decreasing the assortment and quantity of goods and resources that were once uniformly dispersed by the state planning commission (called "goods under the unified ration plan" or "type one goods") and departments under the State Council (called "department-controlled goods" or "type two goods"); switching from the central government's "unified distribution" plan to a system of "regionally balanced allocation" based on the needs of individual provinces, cities and autonomous regions; and giving local government planning offices authority to allocate and transfer goods and resources.
-- Transferring government approval rights for capital construction projects, investment and credit. When projects went beyond prescribed quotas, local governments had to submit a brief petition to the state planning commission. All other projects could be approved locally, and decisions to invest in projects falling below the quotas could be made by local governments. This gave local governments the power to initiate all kinds of projects and raise funds, including raising funds for large-scale projects that exceeded the prescribed quota. Local banks could issue credit according to each area's "production requirements." They could also decide the amount and timing of credit issuance.
-- Transferring finance and tax authority. The decision to implement "tax fanning" was made to strengthen local financial resources and expand the economic power of local governments.
-- Transferring administrative authority for labor and recruitment. The authority to implement labor and recruitment planning policies had been the responsibility of the central government. Now, it would be delegated to provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities.
In addition to granting more autonomy and authority to local governments, the 1958 reforms included certain measures that granted more power to enterprises. Some measures reduced indicative planning targets by cutting the national planning commission's directive targets from 12 requirements to eight in terms of principal product output, staff sizes, wage levels, profits, etc. Other measures altered the original system for "enterprise rewards" (factory manager funds) based on certain proportions of profits, according to industry, by launching a system based on a "proportionally equal sharing of profits."
Other measures expanded the rights of enterprises to organize their workforces, excluding leaders and key technical personnel. Enterprises were given authority to manage their own employees and adjust structures and personnel as long as they did not increase total employment. Enterprises could allocate a portion of capital for company use. They also had the authority to increase, decrease and/or discard fixed assets.
Chaos vs. Rigidity
After these reforms, local governments gained enough power and resources to make their own decisions. And while many enterprises at many levels saw a corresponding rise in autonomy, it still seemed the overall reform plan had left local governments in charge of "workshop" production. Competition rose among local governments for control over enterprises and resources, but no pricing mechanism provided signals to guide decisions. Neither was there natural selection to drive out ill-performing enterprises. Thus, these reforms did not lead the economy in a positive direction; instead, they set the stage for the Great Leap Forward.
On the other hand, since planned economic policies were coming from an elite few, it was easy for ideology to restrain reforms. Knowledge levels, political positions, and even fluctuating moods played roles as well. Indeed, during this phase of reform, politics deeply influenced China's economic progress.

By refusing to alter the framework for maintaining a planned economy – while allocating resources through administrative decree and dividing power among local governments – the planned economy was decentralized. This, coupled with a mass movement of China's population to rural communes, paved the way for the Great Leap Forward.
Under this system, all levels of government responded to Mao Zedong's call to "surpass England in three years, and surpass the United States in 10 years." Local governments fully utilized their power to accumulate resources, launch industrial projects, conduct large-scale employee recruitment, and freely allocate agricultural resources. It was all in the name of achieving impossible feats ordered by the government, such as doubling annual steel production. The result was a war for resource control waged among regions, government departments and enterprises. The practice of "excessive egalitarianism" – in other words "egalitarianism combined with free resource allocation and the authority to collect" -- was in fashion. And the economy was is disarray.

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关键词：Progress Economy econom years China Economy China PART years Progress

陈的研究小组正式提交了这些指示给全国人民代表大会常务委员会。该条例的目的是让更多的权力向地方政府下放权力和地方行政机关，积极性和创造动机放任自流本地企业的倡议。 11月14日，全国人大常委会批准了该条例。他们要在1958年生效。因此，行政权力移交于1958年，主要包括以下内容：
　
-将企业的管辖权。中共中央和国务院联合发布的指示下，4月11日的工业企业管理局技术转让条例。指示说，除了特殊和少数试点企业，国务院认为重要的是，所有的企业管理权限将由个别地方政府举行。结果，百分之八十八的企业和国有机构曾经从属于中央政府移交给地方政府。一些人转移到社区和社区。要客观地看这个问题，工业企业服从中央政府的占39.7中国占1957年工业总产值百分之。但在1958年这一数字急剧下降至百分之13.8。
-转移分配资源的权力。此步骤包括减少的品种和数量的货物和资源，曾经统一由国家计委分散（叫“统一配给计划”或“第一类货物”），各部门根据国务院（称为“部门的货物，管制的物品“或”第二类货物“），从中央的”统一分配“计划的系统”区域均衡分配“的基础上，个别省，市，自治区的需要切换;，给当地政府规划办公室的权威调拨物资和资源。
-转移政府对基本建设项目，投资和信贷审批权。当项目超出了规定的配额，地方政府必须呈交一份简单的请愿书，国家计委。所有其他项目可以通过在当地，并决定在以下的项目投资额下降可由地方政府做。这给地方政府的权力发起各种项目和筹集资金，包括提高大型项目，超出规定的限额资金。本地银行发行信用卡可以根据每个地区的“生产要求。”他们也可以决定的数额和信贷发放时间。
-将财政和税务机关。决定实施“税煽动”了加强地方金融资源，扩大地方政府的经济实力。
-将劳动行政管理部门和招聘。有权实施劳动和招聘规划政策一直是中央政府的责任。现在，这将是下放给各省，自治区，直辖市。
除了给予更多的自主权和权力给地方政府，1958年的改革包括，赋予企业更大的权力的某些措施。一些措施，减少切割主要产品的产量，人员规模，工资水平，利润等其他措施，改变了“企业奖励”（厂长原有制度方面的要求，从12个国家规划委员会的指示目标，以8指示性规划目标资金）的基础上一定比例的利润，根据行业的发射是“平等的比例分享利润为基础的制度。”
其他措施扩大了企业的权利，他们的劳动力组织，包括领导人和主要技术人员。企业获授权管理自己的员工和调整结构，只要他们不增加总就业人员。企业可以分配公司的资金使用的部分。他们还有权增加，减少和/或丢弃固定资产。
混沌与刚度
这些改革之后，地方政府获得了足够的力量和资源，让他们自己的决定。虽然在许多层面，许多企业看到了自主性相应提高，但它似乎仍然总体改革方案已经离开了“地方政府负责车间”生产。之间的竞争上升为对企业和资源的控制地方政府，但没有定价机制提供信号以指导决策。也不是自然选择有赶走不善的企业。因此，这些改革并未导致积极的方向发展经济，相反，他们设置为大跃进阶段。
另一方面，由于计划经济政策，从少数精英的到来，很容易为意识形态制约的改革。知识水平，政治立场，甚至情绪波动扮演的角色也。事实上，在这一阶段的改革，政治，深深地影响了中国的经济发展。



拒绝改变维持一个计划经济的框架-在分配通过行政法令之间分配资源和地方政府的权力-计划经济下放。这是中国与人口大规模迁移到农村公社结合，铺平了大跃进的方式。
根据这个制度，各级政府响应毛泽东号召“三年超过英国，并在10年内赶超美国。”当地政府充分利用其权力，积累资源，开展工业项目，进行大规模的员工招聘，分配和农业资源的自由。这是在实现由政府下令，如每年钢产量翻番壮举的名字都不可能。其结果是对资源控制各地区发动的战争，政府部门和企业。有关“过度的平均主义做法” -换句话说“平均主义与自由的资源分配和权力，就收集”相结合-是时尚。而经济的混乱。


  GOOGLE自动翻译的啊........有错不要找我

陈的研究小组正式提交了这些指示给全国人民代表大会常务委员会。该条例的目的是让更多的权力向地方政府下放权力和地方行政机关，积极性和创造动机放任自流本地企业的倡议。11月14日，全国人大常委会批准了该条例。他们要在1958年生效。因此，行政权力移交于1958年，主要包括以下内容：

-将企业的管辖权。中共中央和国务院联合发布的指示下，4月11日的工业企业管理局技术转让条例。指示说，除了特殊和少数试点企业，国务院认为重要的是，所有的企业管理权限将由个别地方政府举行。结果，百分之八十八的企业和国有机构曾经从属于中央政府移交给地方政府。一些人转移到社区和社区。要客观地看这个问题，工业企业服从中央政府的占39.7中国占1957年工业总产值百分之。但在1958年这一数字急剧下降至百分之13.8。
-转移分配资源的权力。此步骤包括减少的品种和数量的货物和资源，曾经统一由国家计委分散（叫“统一配给计划”或“第一类货物”），各部门根据国务院（称为“部门的货物，管制的物品”或“第二类货物”），从中央的“统一分配”计划的系统“区域均衡分配”的基础上，个别省，市，自治区的需要切换;，给当地政府规划办公室的权威调拨物资和资源。
-转移政府对基本建设项目，投资和信贷审批权。当项目超出了规定的配额，地方政府必须呈交一份简单的请愿书，国家计委。所有其他项目可以通过在当地，并决定在以下的项目投资额下降可由地方政府做。这给地方政府的权力发起各种项目和筹集资金，包括提高大型项目，超出规定的限额资金。本地银行发行信用卡可以根据每个地区的“生产要求。”他们也可以决定的数额和信贷发放时间。
-将财政和税务机关。决定实施“税煽动”了加强地方金融资源，扩大地方政府的经济实力。
-将劳动行政管理部门和招聘。有权实施劳动和招聘规划政策一直是中央政府的责任。现在，这将是下放给各省，自治区，直辖市。
除了给予更多的自主权和权力给地方政府，1958年的改革包括，赋予企业更大的权力的某些措施。一些措施，减少切割主要产品的产量，人员规模，工资水平，利润等其他措施，改变了“企业奖励”（厂长原有制度方面的要求，从12个国家规划委员会的指示目标，以8指示性规划目标资金）的基础上一定比例的利润，根据行业的发射是“平等的比例分享利润为基础的制度。“
其他措施扩大了企业的权利，他们的劳动力组织，包括领导人和主要技术人员。企业获授权管理自己的员工和调整结构，只要他们不增加总就业人员。企业可以分配公司的资金使用的部分。他们还有权增加，减少和/或丢弃固定资产。
混沌与刚度
这些改革之后，地方政府获得了足够的力量和资源，让他们自己的决定。虽然在许多层面，许多企业看到了自主性相应提高，但它似乎仍然总体改革方案已经离开了“地方政府负责车间”生产。之间的竞争上升为对企业和资源的控制地方政府，但没有定价机制提供信号以指导决策。也不是自然选择有赶走不善的企业。因此，这些改革并未导致积极的方向发展经济，相反，他们设置为大跃进阶段。
另一方面，由于计划经济政策，从少数精英的到来，很容易为意识形态制约的改革。知识水平，政治立场，甚至情绪波动扮演的角色也。事实上，在这一阶段的改革，政治，深深地影响了中国的经济发展。
 
 

拒绝改变维持一个计划经济的框架-在分配通过行政法令之间分配资源和地方政府的权力-计划经济下放。这是中国与人口大规模迁移到农村公社结合，铺平了大跃进的方式。
根据这个制度，各级政府响应毛泽东号召“三年超过英国，并在10年内赶超美国。”当地政府充分利用其权力，积累资源，开展工业项目，进行大规模的员工招聘，分配和农业资源的自由。这是在实现由政府下令，如每年钢产量翻番壮举的名字都不可能。其结果是对资源控制各地区发动的战争，政府部门和企业。有关“过度的平均主义做法” -换句话说“平均主义与自由的资源分配和权力，就收集”相结合-是时尚。而经济的混乱。
 

  谷歌自动翻译的啊........有错不要找我